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Research has found an earnings advantage for married men as well as men with 
children. In contrast, married women and women with children often receive a much 
smaller wage premium, or even face a wage penalty. Most research on the marriage and 
motherhood income penalties has focused on the private labor market, tacitly assuming 
that the laws and regulations that govern public sector occupations will prevent this 
form of occupational gender inequality within these domains. Whether this is the case 
remains an empirical question. With increasing numbers of females entering the labor 
force, examining whether these forms of occupational gender inequality are present 
within public sector jobs has become more important. Using data from the Current 
Population Survey covering 41 years, I explore the gendered effects of marriage and 
parenthood on income inequality using police officers as a case study of a public-sector 
occupation. My analyses reveal that female police officers experience both marriage 
and motherhood income penalties, though the marriage penalty is partially explained by 
the stronger negative effect of motherhood on female police officers’ income. 
Furthermore, these analyses suggest that male officers enjoy stable marriage and 
fatherhood income advantages over time, but females continuously face a motherhood 
penalty. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of my findings for future 
research.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
From 1950 to 1990, the number of women participating in the American labor 
force doubled, from around 30 percent to 60 percent (Byker 2016). This proportion has 
continued to increase, in what Goldin calls “the most significant change in the labor 
market over the past century” (2006:1). Accompanying the increase of women in the 
labor-force, the number of working mothers has also grown (Byker 2016) and more 
married women are choosing to enter and remain in the labor-force than ever before 
(Blau and Kahn 2007b). These structural changes in the gender composition of the labor 
force raise several concerns over the equitable treatment of women, and previous 
research has found less mobility and promotion for female workers, women being more 
likely to hold subordinate positions within the workplace, the devaluation of female-
dominated occupations, and a persistent gender gap in earnings within the U.S. labor 
force (England et al. 1994; England, Allison, and Wu 2007; Misra and Strader 2013). 
This paper will examine one form of this occupational gender inequality, 
focusing on how marriage and parenthood affect income for men and women. Prior 
research has found that women have continuously earned less pay on average than their 
male counterparts (e.g.: Bernhardt, Morris, and Handcock 1995; Jarrell and Stanley 
2004; Blau and Kahn 2007a). In addition to this gender gap in pay, some women face 
other disadvantages, including receiving an income penalty for being married or having 
children (Budig and England 2001). There is a growing body of research that examines 
the negative effects of marriage (Waite 1995; Loughran and Zissimopoulos 2009) and 
motherhood (Budig and England 2001; Anderson, Binder, and Krause 2003; Correll, 
Benard, and In Paik 2007; Glauber 2007; Gangl and Ziefle 2009; Budig and Hodges 
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2010; Glauber 2012; Weeden, Cha, and Bucca 2016; Yu and Kuo 2017) on female 
income. Exacerbating this form of occupational gender inequality is the well-
documented income premium experienced by married men (Hersch and Stratton 2000; 
Chun and Lee 2001; Ginther and Zavodny 2001; Antonovics and Town 2004; 
Dougherty 2006; Lincoln 2008; Cheng 2015) and men with children (Glauber 2008; 
Killewald 2013; Killewald and Gough 2013). 
Several theoretical mechanisms have been proposed to explain these differences 
in pay by marriage and parenthood (Budig and Hodges 2010; Gough and Noonan 2013; 
England et al. 2016; Yu and Kuo 2017). Most of this research, however, has focused on 
the entire labor market or among occupationally specific studies, and the emphasis has 
been on private sector – as opposed to public sector – occupations. One possible reason 
for this oversight is that researchers assume that the formal rules and regulations – such 
as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 – make discrimination against females illegal (England 
et al. 2007) and these rules may be implemented more effectively in public sector 
positions compared to private sector jobs. By not focusing on public sector jobs, 
however, researchers are tacitly assuming that the occupational gender inequalities that 
are a persistent feature of the general labor-force and are widely present in several 
occupationally specific private sector jobs, will not be present in public sector 
occupations. Whether this is the case remains an empirical question. 
Using police as a case study of occupational gender inequality in the public 
sector, this study answers the following questions, “Is there a gendered marriage or 
parenthood effect on income within the police sector and how have these income 
differences changed over time?” I use data from the nationally representative Current 
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Population Survey (CPS) from 1976 to 2017 to model the marriage and parenthood 
income differential among police officers over the past 41 years. I advance the research 
on the marriage and parenthood wage effects, as well as occupational inequality among 
police, in three ways. First, instead of exploring marriage and motherhood penalty in the 
overall labor force or private sector jobs, I decompose the effects of marriage and 
parental status on income in the conventionally male-dominated public-sector 
occupation of law-enforcement. Second, I also explore whether marriage or motherhood 
plays a stronger role in shaping the compensation structure of female police officers. 
Finally, taking advantage of the large sample size and long-time series, I track whether 















Chapter 2: Background 
Occupational gender inequality has been, and remains, a persistent feature of the 
American labor market (e.g.: Katrin, Thomas, and Carsten 2017; Thomas 2017). 
Despite the increase in women’s labor force participation, females continue to 
experience a variety of inequalities within the workplace, including the devaluation of 
female-dominated occupations and an underrepresentation of women within high-
paying professions and managerial positions (Blau and Kahn 2007b). Women’s work is 
broadly under-valued relative to men’s labor (England et al. 1994; Cohen and Huffman 
2003a, 2003b), and those occupations with the largest proportion of female employees 
tend to be culturally feminized, and therefore devalued (Levanon, England, and Allison 
2009). Furthermore, female employees tend to cluster near the bottom of professional 
hierarchies, have lower average earnings, have less occupational authority, and 
decreased advancement potential in comparison with men (Davies-Netzley 1998). Also, 
females experience persistent wage inequality compared to their male counterparts 
(England et al. 2007; Mouw and Kalleberg 2010). Beyond these forms of inequality, 
marriage and parenthood are additional mechanisms that can lead to occupational 
disadvantage among women in the labor market (Budig and England 2001) and are at 
least partly associated with the gender gap in pay within the general U.S. labor market. 
2.1 Marriage Effects on Income 
One important form of occupational gender inequality is the effect of marriage 
on income. The vast majority of research in this area finds that married females are 
payed significantly less than unmarried females (Waite 1995; Loughran and 
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Zissimopoulos 2009).1  Korenman and Neumark (1991) found that marriage accounted 
for almost one-third of the gender difference in pay between men and women. 
Comparatively, married males receive a marriage premium and often earn significantly 
more than single men (Chun and Lee 2001). 
A number of theoretical mechanisms have been proposed to explain this 
marriage income differential, including within-household specialization theory (Becker 
1981; Hersch and Stratton 2000; Lincoln 2008; Rodgers and Stratton 2010; de Linde 
Leonard and Stanley 2015), selection hypothesis (Chun and Lee 2001; Ginther and 
Zavodny 2001; Bonilla and Kiraly 2013; Ashwin and Isupova 2014), employer 
discrimination (Bartlett and Callahan 1984; Hersch and Stratton 2000), and 
compensating differential theory (Reed and Harford 1989; Pollmann-Schult 2011). For 
example, according to the household specialization perspective, there exists cultural 
assumptions that married women are more likely to specialize in household labor while 
married men are expected to specialize in paid labor market activities (Becker 1981; 
Gupta 1999). Because employers perceive married women as less committed to their 
jobs, less productive at work, and more focused on housework (Bartlett and Callahan 
1984; Hersch and Stratton 2000), they feel justified in paying married women less than 
women who are not married. Conversely, the selection hypothesis argues that the reason 
males experience a marriage premium is that high-earning men are more valued 
marriage partners due to their earnings capability, and are therefore more likely to get 
                                               
1 While the negative effects of marriage on females’ income is the most common 
finding for research in this area, some studies have come to contradictory conclusions, 
including that marriage does not shape female pay (Korenman and Neumark 1992) or 
that females receive a marriage premium, though a smaller premium than men 
(Dougherty 2006; Glauber 2007; Killewald and Gough 2013). 
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married than less successful men (Cohen and Haberfeld 1991; Ginther and Zavodny 
2001; Ahituv and Lerman 2007; Rodgers and Stratton 2010; Bonilla and Kiraly 2013). 
Researchers also point out several other explanations that explain the differential effects 
of marriage on men’s and women’s income, including more job training for married 
males (Rodgers and Stratton 2010), the aggregating effect of decreased job mobility for 
married women (Loughran and Zissimopoulos 2009), and gender differences in the 
investment in human capital (Becker 1985; Gough and Noonan 2013). 
Despite the large literature on the gender differences in marriage’s effects on 
wages and income (Dougherty 2006; Loughran and Zissimopoulos 2009; Cheng 2015), 
research in this area has largely focused on the general labor market. Although we know 
a lot about the marriage wage effect in the overall labor market, we do not know 
whether these differences exist or operate in the same way among employees within 
specific occupations. Focusing on public sector jobs, I examine whether this form of 
occupational inequality is present among law enforcement officers and how this pattern 
of gender disadvantage has changed over time. 
2.2 Parenthood Effects on Income 
Like the gendered marriage effects on income, a large body of research has 
found a strong positive relationship between parental status on male wages (Lundberg 
and Rose 2000; Glauber 2008; Hodges and Budig 2010; Killewald 2013) and a strong 
negative effect of parenthood on female wages (Budig and England 2001; Glauber 
2007; Budig and Hodges 2010; Kahn, García-Manglano, and Bianchi 2014).2 Mothers, 
                                               
2 There is a small contrarian body of research that finds either no direct effect of 
motherhood on women’s wages (Korenman and Neumark 1992), or positive effect in 
certain occupations and situations (Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel 2005; Buchmann 
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on average, earn less than women without children, and less than men irrespective of 
whether they have children (Gough and Noonan 2013; Ipshita Pal and Waldfogel 2016). 
Moreover, this motherhood penalty has remained relatively stable over time (Avellar 
and Smock 2003; Misra and Strader 2013). 
In terms of the mechanisms that may explain the association between 
motherhood and lower wages, there is considerable overlap with the literature on 
marriage’s role in patterning income. Budig and England (2001) suggested four primary 
explanations for motherhood penalty: First, mothers will lose job experience as they are 
expected to take time off to have and care for their children; Second, their exists cultural 
assumptions that mothers will be less productive at work and have greater 
responsibilities concerning childcare and household labor; Third, women with children 
may be more likely to trade off higher-wage jobs for more family-friendly jobs that 
provide more flexibility and accommodation to balance family and career (Felfe 2012; 
Yu and Kuo 2017); Lastly, mothers may experience aggregating discrimination from 
employers (Benard and Correll 2010), who may pay women less than men (gender 
discrimination) and furthermore may pay mothers less than non-parents (motherhood 
discrimination) due to their cultural biases. Correll and colleagues (2007) tested these 
status-based forms of discrimination in an experiment and found that mothers suffered a 
substantial wage penalty and were penalized on a host of measures, including perceived 
competence and recommended starting salary, while men benefited from being a father. 
                                                                                                                                         
and McDaniel 2016). Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel (2005) found mothers with a 
college education enjoyed a wage boost of about 4 percent compared to college-
educated childless women. Buchmann and McDaniel (2016) examined the family wage 
gap in specific elite male-dominated professions, such as science, engineering, 
medicine, and law finding that mothers gained earning premium compared to mothers 
in female-dominated professions. 
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A review of the motherhood wage penalty literature by Gough and Noonan (2013) 
systematically summarized the main theoretical explanations for this well-established 
finding, and these included human capital, work effort, job characteristics/compensating 
differentials, discrimination, and occupational selection processes. 
The research on parenthood’s effects on income, like the research on marriage 
and income, focuses primarily on the general labor market and this research provides a 
macro view of occupational gender inequality in the U.S. There are, however, some 
limitations to this research. One problem is that by focusing on the entire labor market, 
this research risks over-estimating the gendered effects of marriage and parenthood on 
wages due to job sorting. Because of the failure to account for the selection process into 
different occupations, the differences these researchers observe may rely on comparing 
individuals with high-prestige, high-wage jobs to lower earning occupations. Mouw and 
Kalleberg (2010) have argued that the overall gender gap in pay is largely the result of 
between-occupation inequality, with 66 percent of the increase in wage inequality from 
1992 to 2008 explained by between-occupational sorting. While this is important 
information about the state of the entire U.S. labor market, the emphasis on between-
occupational difference makes understanding the marriage and parenthood effects on 
income more difficult due to gendered selection process into different occupations.3 
                                               
3 While focusing on within occupational differences may solve some of these problems, 
others emerge. For instance, selection into a male-dominated occupation – particularly 
among females – may shape some of the processes analyzed here. While I do not 
believe that individuals selecting into this particular occupation are expecting to 
experience a gender difference in marriage and parenthood’s effect on their pay, I am 
unable to account for how this and other unmeasured factors may shape my results. 
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Some research has focused on the within-occupational marriage and parenthood 
effects on income (Kelly and Grant 2012; Buchmann and McDaniel 2016). For 
example, one study has found a large marriage premium for married men compared to 
unmarried men among managers and professionals in a single firm (Korenman and 
Neumark 1991). Buchmann and McDaniel (2016) found that women with children 
experienced a wage penalty in female-dominated professions, but a wage premium 
within some traditionally male-dominated professions. Another study on within-
occupational inequality showed that female clergy were penalized because of their 
marriage and motherhood status (Schleifer and Miller 2017). Overall, these studies 
partially overcome the issue of occupational sorting by comparing individuals within 
the same occupational setting. However, the occupational specific studies have 
concentrated on private sector jobs. By focusing on private sector jobs, researchers have 
assumed that these types of occupations are less subject to the formal rules and 
regulations governing occupational gender inequality, whereas public sector jobs may 
be less prone to occupational gender inequality because of laws and regulations 
governing these illegal practices (Mandel and Semyonov 2014). Whether this is the case 
remains to be seen. 
2.3 Police as a Case Study of Public Sector Occupations 
Policing provides an excellent opportunity to explore the marriage and 
parenthood effects on income within a public-sector occupation. Law enforcement is 
culturally understood as hyper-masculine profession (Garcia 2003; Schulze 2011; 
Archbold and Schulz 2012). Within this male-dominated field, female police officers 
have long been characterized as ‘the mother’ and their work has been perceived as 
10 
directed towards the protection of home and family (Garcia 2003) or towards social and 
protective services (Schulz 1995). Historically, females have also been placed within 
lower ranks within these law enforcement organizations and have received fewer 
opportunities for promotion (Schulz 1993). Under these conditions, previous research 
suggests that this occupational domain would experience high degrees of gender income 
inequality. 
Despite their historic marginalized role within this hyper-masculine occupation, 
female police officers have seen their occupational roles shift from police matrons to 
policewomen to police officers and/or crime fighters (Archbold and Schulz 2012). 
Female police officers have outperformed, or performed as well as, male police officers 
in some types of jobs (Garcia 2003), and have shown themselves to be equally 
competent with male patrol officers (Archbold and Schulz 2012). Moreover, police 
agencies tend to have equal occupational expectations for male and female officers 
(Schulze 2011). These changes have occurred despite the “hegemonic masculinity” 
governing this domain (Schulze 2011) and this may lead researchers to expect a greater 
degree of gender parity within this public-sector occupation. 
Moreover, within public sector occupations there is also a presumption that the 
strict legal rules and regulations governing gender discrimination– such as the 1963 
Equal Pay Act and 1964 Civil Rights Act – are more likely to be enforced within these 
jobs and this should guarantee equal pay for equal work and prohibit sex-based 
employment discrimination among police (Alkadry and Tower 2006; Seklecki and 
Paynich 2007; Reese and Warner 2011). The Crime Control Act of 1973 specifies 
federal funds for law enforcement agencies are in part based on their non-discriminatory 
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employment practices, which some research suggests has benefited female officers to 
some extent (Archbold and Schulz 2012). Others have found that public sector jobs are 
more attractive to women due to the more egalitarian pay system and effective 
antidiscrimination policy enforcement (Mandel and Semyonov 2014). This would also 
lead researchers to expect a smaller gender pay gap in the public realm compared to the 
private labor market. Contrary to this finding, Luo, Schleifer, and Hill (2018) found that 
female police officers earn consistently less than male officers, though there has been a 
narrowing of the gender income gap among police officers compared to the general 
population. 
It is the juxtaposition between the hyper-masculine occupational setting – where 
research suggests we would expect a greater degree of gender inequality (Shelley, 
Morabito, and Tobin-Gurley 2011) – and the public-sector occupations – where we 
assume there will be little to no gender inequality due to the enforcement of legal 
precedent – that makes law enforcement the ideal place to explore within-occupational 
gender inequality. With increasing numbers of females entering into the police labor 
force (Luo et al. 2018), examining whether any gender differences in marriage’s and 
parenthood’s effects on income are present within this occupation will inform the 
literatures on occupational gender inequality as well as inequality within U.S. law 
enforcement. By exploring the gender difference in marriage’s and parenthood’s 
patterning of police pay, I will uncover whether and to what degree these forms of 
occupational gender inequality exist among police in the U.S. and how any disparities 
may have changed over time. 
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Chapter 3: Data and Methods 
3.1 Data 
My study uses data from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1976 to 2017 (Flood et al. 2017).4 The CPS 
data, jointly sponsored by the U.S. Census Bureau and Bureau of Labor Statistics, are 
the primary monthly household survey of the U.S. population and provide information 
on the labor force, employment, earnings, and other demographic characteristics. The 
CPS has been widely used to study income inequality in the U.S. (e.g.: Reynolds and 
Wenger 2012; Moore 2017). From 1976-2017, the CPS surveyed more than 7 million 
individuals, about 178,000 individuals each year.5 For my purposes, the CPS includes a 
large sample of police officers that allows for tracking trends of marriage and parental 
status’ impact on police income over the last 41 years. 
3.1.1 Police in the CPS  
The CPS collected information about respondents’ jobs by asking “What kind of 
work do you do, that is, what is your occupation?” With this information, occupation 
was coded into the contemporary census occupational classification system. The coding 
scheme for the occupational data in the CPS has changed over time. For example, 
occupations are coded using the 1970 scheme from 1971-1982 and the 1980 scheme 
from 1983-1991, and so forth. For each census occupational scheme, the occupation 
codes for police officers have varied. To work with a consistent occupational coding 
                                               
4 The CPS data extract is downloaded from the IPUMS-CPS database at the Minnesota 
Population Center (Flood et al. 2017). See “https://cps.ipums.org/cps/” for more 
information. 
5 The CPS data on the IPUMS are available from 1962. Prior to 1976, the occupational 
information collected by the CPS does not allow me to isolate police officers. I 
therefore limit my sample to 1976 and beyond. 
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scheme for 1976 forward, I use the CPS’s OCC1950 variable that recodes occupations 
into a common format using the 1950 census classification scheme and thereby provides 
occupational comparability over time. From the OCC1950 variable, I combine three 
police categories – marshals and constables (𝑂𝐶𝐶1950	 = 	771), policemen and 
detectives (𝑂𝐶𝐶1950	 = 	773), and sheriffs and bailiffs (𝑂𝐶𝐶1950	 = 	782) – to 
identify police officers throughout my time series.6 Following previous research (e.g.: 
Schwartz 2010; Moore 2017), I limit my sample to individuals who are between the 
ages of 18 and 65, who are currently employed, and who worked at least 50 weeks in 
the previous year. After adjusting for missing data, this analytical sample includes 
16,935 individuals who report police as their primary occupation, about 413 officers on 
average for each survey year. Among the police officers in this time-series, 2,628 (15.5 
percent) are female. 
3.1.2 Dependent Variable: Natural Log of Yearly Income 
The outcome variable in this study is the natural logarithm of respondent’s total 
pretax wage and salary income from the previous year, standardized to 2017 dollars.7 
The CPS collects information about wages and salaried income from the respondent’s 
primary occupation and this information will form the basis of my income variable. For 
confidentiality reasons, the CPS top codes reported income over a certain amount to 
                                               
6 As a robustness check, I create a police indicator using the non-harmonized CPS 
occupational information. To do so, I follow Meyer and Osborne (2005) who proposed 
a mapping between occupational category systems as they existed in the Census of 
Population from 1960 to 2000, and in the CPS from 1968 to 2003, into a unified set of 
categories. Following this procedure, I test the consistency of this measure of police 
officers and find the number of police officers using this procedure is identical to using 
the OCC1950 procedure described above.  
7 All incomes are converted to 2017 dollars using Consumer Price Index (CPI). For 
more detail information about Consumer Price Index, see: 
“https://cps.ipums.org/cps/cpi99.shtml”. 
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prevent the identification of individuals with extremely high incomes. This top coding 
system has changed multiple times over my time-series. To utilize my entire time-
series, following Larrimore, Burkhauser, Feng, and Zayatz (2008), I replace the 
extremely high incomes with a uniform top-coded values for each survey year and then, 
following the “Rule of Thumb” (Burkhauser, Feng and Jenkins 2009), I replace top-
coded income with 1.4 times that value.8 
3.1.3 Key Independent Variables: Gender, Marital and Parental Status  
Gender is a binary variable, coded 1 for females and 0 for males. The CPS 
collected information about respondent’s marital status by asking “What is your current 
marital status?” I recode this information into a binary variable where 1 denotes 
respondents who are currently married, and this allows me to test the effects of marriage 
on police income. The CPS also collected information about respondent’s children by 
asking “How many children (includes biological children, adopted children and step-
children) are currently living in the household?” I recode this into an indicator for any 
children in home (having child in home coded as 1, otherwise 0). While the children at 
home is not a strict measure of parenthood – respondent may not live with their children 
– this provides a reasonable proxy for parenthood and follows previous research (e.g.: 
Buchmann and McDaniel 2016). 
3.1.4 Control Variables 
                                               
8 Overall, 25 police officers (0.11 percent) in my sample report top-coded income. The 
CPS also uses a “hot deck” imputation of missing income and wage information and 
this process has been shown to bias income estimates (For an overview, see: Mouw and 
Kalleberg 2010). To avoid this issue, I exclude all imputed wage values in my analyses. 
The 1994 and 1995 survey year do not include information about which income values 
are imputed and I exclude these years from my data. 
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I control for a number of additional factors that may shape respondent’s income. 
Age is a continuous variable that ranges from 18 to 65 and I also include an age-squared 
term (Age2) to account for any curvilinear relationship between age and income. 
Working hours per week is continuous variable that runs from 1 to 99. Following 
Weeden et al. (2016), I recode this information to 3 dummy variables: working less than 
35 hours a week (part-time work - reference category), working between 35 and 55 
hours a week (full-time work), and working over 55 hours a week (overtime work). To 
control for respondent’s race, I create two indicator variables for black and other race 
individuals with whites as the reference category. To control for educational differences 
in income, I recode the CPS education information into four dummy variables – less 
than high school (reference category), high school, bachelor’s degree, and advanced 
degree.9 Living in a city is a binary indicator of urban residence (living in city coded as 
1 otherwise 0) and I create a series of indicator variables for those living in the mid-
west, south, and west with northeast as a reference, to control for regional differences. 
In additional models, I control for whether police officers are members of a Union with 
a binary indicator coded 1 for those who are union members and 0 for those who are 
not. The union membership variable in the CPS is only collected from 1990-2017 and 
was only asked of a random subsample of all respondents. This measure, therefore, 
includes a large amount of missing information (about 81.6%). Because of this, I only 
                                               
9 CPS changed how it collected information on educational attainment in 1992. Before 
1992 the CPS asked how many years of education have respondents completed and in 
1992 and after they asked the highest degree every completed. For consistency, I recode 
education before 1992 so that respondents who have not completed 12 years of school 
are coded as less than high school, those finishing 12th grade up to 3 years of college as 
high school education, completing 4 years of college or obtain a bachelor’s degree as 
bachelor’s degree, and those who complete over 5 years of college coded as advanced 
degree. 
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include this measure in supplementary analyses. Finally, to capture change over time, I 
include a continuous year of survey variable, coded from 0 for the first year 1976 to 41 
for the most recent year 2017.10 
3.2 Modeling Strategy 
For my CPS police sample, I use an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression of 
the natural log of yearly income on my independent and control variables. The linear 
regression models are estimated using the following form: 
	ln(𝑖𝑛𝑐) = 	𝛽5 +	𝛽7	(𝑥1) +	𝛽9(𝑥2) +	𝛽:(𝑥3) + 𝜷𝟒(𝒙𝟒) + 𝜷𝟓(𝒙𝟓) + 𝑒 
where ln (inc) is the natural log of yearly income in 2017 dollars, x1 is a binary 
indicator for females with the corresponding regression coefficient captured in the 𝛽7. 
Two indicators x2 and x3 are included to examine the effects of marital and parental 
status on police income, respectively. Some models include interactions which are 
represented by the x4 vector with corresponding coefficients of	𝜷𝟒 vector. Likewise, all 
the control variables are captured by the x5 vector with 𝜷𝟓 vector of coefficients 
showing each control variables’ impact on individual’s yearly income. Finally, 𝛽5 
captures the model intercept and 𝑒 captures any residual model error. All models use a 
list-wise deletion strategy to account for missing information. Among the variables that 
contain missing data, living in a city has the largest percentage of missing at about 17.6 
percent, followed by income and age, around 4 percent and 2 percent respectively. 
 
 
                                               
10 To test whether the effects of time on income was linear, additional models (not 
shown here) included a year squared term. Results from this specification suggest a 
linear trend best captures change in police income. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
To address my research questions, I pursue both descriptive and regression-
based analyses to uncover any pattern of marriage and parenthood effects on police 
income by gender. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics from my CPS data, 
averaged over the entire time-series. I have broken the data down into two groups: male 
officers and female officers. This descriptive information shows that the within-
occupational gender difference in income among police is quite large, with male police 
officers making about 11.6 thousand dollars more in median income than female police 
officers, averaged over these 41 years. We can also see from these descriptive statistics 
a difference in the proportion of married individuals among male and female police. 
Only 47.5 percent of females working in law enforcement are married, compared to 78 
percent of male police officers and this amounts to a greater than 30-percentage point 
difference in marital patterns by gender within this occupation. Likewise, the proportion 
of children in home for male and female police officers is also different, with 54 percent 
of women report having a child in their home compared to 65 percent of men. Male and 
female police officers also show some minor differences in racial composition, but 
outside of these differences they have a similar demographic profile. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
To test whether these descriptive differences hold when controlling for 
additional covariates, I present a series of regression models in Table 2. For these 
analyses, Model 1 includes all key independent and control variables to determine if 
there are any general marriage and parenthood differences in income among police after 
controlling for additional factors. Model 2 includes an additional interaction between 
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my gender and marriage indicators to determine if the effects of marriage on income 
vary by gender. Model 3 includes an interaction between my female indicator and the 
indicator of parenthood. Finally, Model 4 in this table includes the marriage and 
parenthood gender interactions simultaneously to determine which of these family 
characteristics has a greater impact on police income. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Model 1 shows the conditional average difference in income across my 
covariates. Here, we see that females earn about 16.5 percent less 
(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒= (exp(−0.180) − 1) ∗ 100) 11 than males even after controlling 
for additional factors, when averaging over these 41 years. We can also see from Model 
1 that both marriage and having child in the household have a significantly positive 
impact on income among all police officers, though the size of the premium is not large. 
Compared to unmarried police officers, those who are married earn an average of 4 
percent more income per year, and those with children earn 2 percent more than those 
without kids in their home. As we shall see, these average differences mask some 
important gender variation within these data. 
Model 2 shows important gender differences in the effect of marriage on income 
by decomposing these effects. Married female police officers make around 18.5 percent 
less(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠= (exp((−0.152 + 0.053 − 0.050) −
(0.053)) − 1) ∗ 100) 12 than married male officers, 14 percent less than unmarried 
males, and around 0.2 percent more than unmarried female officers. Figure 1 visualizes 
                                               
11 I use this formula to convert the coefficients into percentage differences to aide 
interpretation: 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒	𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒	𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = (exp(𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡) − 1) ∗ 100 
12 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥	𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒	𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = (exp(𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡7 − 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡9) − 1) ∗
100 
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these differences by plotting predicted income across these groups of interest. Here we 
can see that the income for males, both married and unmarried, far exceeds the expected 
income for females. Among males, there is a large marriage premium with married 
male law enforcement officers earning around 3,224 dollars more in yearly income 
compared to unmarried males. Females show a slight marriage income differential, with 
unmarried females earning around 112 dollars less in yearly income. While the 
magnitude of the marriage difference among females is small, it does suggest that at 
best these women experience no marriage effect on income. Given that there is such a 
large difference among males, the compensation processes here appear strongly 
gendered. 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Model 3 from Table 2 decomposes the effect of having children in the home on 
male and female income. Figure 2 plots the predicted income across these groups to 
visualize any differences. Here we can see that motherhood exerts a stronger influence 
on female police income compared to marriage. Again, male police officers, whether 
they have a child in the home or not, earn much more than females. Males benefit from 
fatherhood, making 62,760 dollars expected income averaged during the 41-year time-
series, which is 1,880 dollars more than their male counterparts with no children. 
Conversely, and as would be expected from research on the general labor force and 
private sector jobs, publicly employed female police officers are penalized due to their 
parental status, with an average earning of only 51,027 dollars compared to females 
without children who are expected to earn around 52,541 per year (a 1,514-dollar 
difference), while controlling for other factors. Female police with children earn the 
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least among these four groups – males with and without children, females with and 
without children – while males with children earn the most. It suggests that motherhood 
produces negative effects on income for female police officers. Model 4 includes both 
the marriage and parenthood gender interactions to determine if one effects is stronger 
than the other and it appears that parenthood status exerts a stronger influence than 
marriage on income for female officers. 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Since I combine three categories to identify police officers, these main models 
do not distinguish the effects of marriage and parenthood on income for the different 
types of officers I am able to isolate. To examine any possible differences across these 
groups, I run four additional analyses with interactions of female*married and 
female*child on ‘policemen and detectives’, and ‘sheriffs and bailiffs’ (There are only 
18 individuals who report being ‘marshals and constables’, thus statistical analyses on 
this group are not warranted). I present the results from these models in Table 3. These 
models reveal that the marriage and parenthood patterning income for male and female 
police officers operate in similar ways across the different types of police captured in 
these data. To be specific, females who report working as ‘policemen and detectives’ 
experience both marriage and motherhood income penalties. Marriage and having 
children in the home also exert negative effects on income for females who report 
working as ‘sheriffs and bailiffs’, however, these effects are not significant in these 
models. This lack of significance may be due to the greatly reduced sample size and the 
general pattern I observe suggests that with a larger sample we would see a similar 
pattern across both groups. 
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My second set of analyses explores whether these patterns of marriage and 
parenthood on police income have changed overtime. To test this, I ran additional 
models on a male and female subsample of my data. Within these models, I include 
additional interactions of my marriage and parenthood indicators and year of survey 
variable and then I plot my results (See Table 4 for regression model results). In Figure 
3, I plot the predicted marital income differences for males and females over the past 41 
years (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑	𝐼𝑛𝑐WXYZ	[ − 𝑈𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑	𝐼𝑛𝑐WXYZ	[). These figures can be interpreted 
such that a plotted line above the 0 line represents an income premium and a plotted line 
below the 0 line represents an income penalty. The income difference for married 
versus unmarried males is around 2,434 dollars in 1976 and by 2017 this amount has 
increased only slightly to 2,786 dollars, an insignificant change. Thus, the marriage 
income premium for male police officers has remained consistent. Female police 
officers, conversely, experience a decline in marriage’s effect on their income. In 1976, 
married female police earned 2,034 dollars more in income than unmarried female 
police and by 2017 this amount has decreased to 732 dollars. Despite these shifts over 
time among females, the trend in the income difference for married and unmarried 
female police officers is not significant. Overall, male police officers experience a 
marriage premium while females experience no marital difference in income, and the 
patterns have remained consistent over the past 41 years. 
Figure 4 plots the parenthood effects on male and female income over the past 
41 years. Here we can see that male police officers experience a fatherhood income 
premium over time (around 1,700 dollars bonus), and this premium has remained stable 
during the past four decades. By contrast, female police officers with children are paid 
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less than those who do not have children in the home. We can see that the income 
difference for females who have children in the home and who do not have children in 
the home is negative and it becomes worse in recent years. In 1976, the motherhood 
penalty was 141 dollars less than females with no children and by 2017 this proportion 
had increased to 1,715 less than non-mothers. To sum up, male officers enjoy both a 
marriage and fatherhood income premium and this premium remains stable over time, 
whereas female police officers experience a growing motherhood income penalty and a 
stable non-effect of marriage on their income. 
 [FIGURE 3 and 4 ABOUT HERE] 
The final analysis for this project is a robustness check to determine whether 
being a member of a police union shapes marriage’s and parenthood’s effects on police 
wages (See Table 5 for the regression analyses). Information about union membership 
was only collect from 1990-2017 in the CPS-ASEC, and this measure will limit my 
sample due to large missing data issues. That said, some research suggests that unions 
may have a negative effect on occupational gender inequality within highly masculine 
occupations (Luo et al. 2018). I use what information is available within my data to 
account for this possibility. 
Figure 5 and 6 show the marriage and parenthood income difference over time 
for male and female police officers controlling for union membership. When taking 
union membership into account, males still experience a constant marriage income 
benefit from 1990 forward, yet the income differential associated with marriage for 
females changes a lot. Married females have a large income advantage over unmarried 
females among the first ten years, but the trend of income differential among married 
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and unmarried females keeps declining and now married and unmarried female police 
officers show relative income parity. In Figure 6, as I plot the parenthood trend for 
males and females, we see an increasing and positive income gap between fathers and 
non-fathers. The income differences for female officers with children and without 
children decline sharply across this time-series. While these analyses are suggestive, the 
data limitations and the much smaller time series means that these trends cannot achieve 
significance in my formal models. Future research will need to unpack these processes 
with more fine-grained data. 
















Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Occupational gender inequality is a persistent feature in the U.S. labor market 
and has remained so for decades. With the increasing number of female police officers, 
a growing body of research has focused on these women (e.g.: Leger 1997; Franklin 
2007; Ireland and Berg 2007; Shelley et al. 2011). Studies of the American police 
occupation have highlighted both the similarities and differences among male and 
female police officers, including arrest decision-making, use of force, and job 
performance (Ffrench and Waugh 1998; Archbold and Schulz 2012). A recent study on 
police moms by Ellis (2017), reveals that policewomen who are mothers face multiple 
challenges, especially when they have children at home, and therefore have poor 
retention rates during childbearing and child-rearing years. Despite the increasing 
research on female police officers, few studies have explicitly investigated any potential 
gender inequality in income among police officers, and no studies have explored the 
gender difference in marriage’s and parenthood’s effects on male and female income. 
To be specific, whether marriage and parenthood have a gendered effect on income 
within this traditionally male-dominated occupational sector was previously not known. 
Using over four decades of data from the CPS, this study exposes the ways that 
marriage or parenthood affects the income of police officers and how the income 
differences have changed over time. 
Overall, this study provides evidence that the gender income differential in the 
police occupation is shaped in part by marital and parenthood effects. To be clear, we 
see from my analyses that female police officers who are married are paid on average 
18.5 percent less than their married male counterparts, 14 percent less than unmarried 
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male officers, and 0.2 percent more than their unmarried female counterparts. While the 
income gap between married and unmarried female police officers is small, when 
juxtaposed to the large marriage premium experience by males this suggests that the 
compensation processes within this occupation are highly gendered, despite the rules 
governing public sector jobs. Additionally, female police officers are penalized due to 
their parental status. Female police officers with a child in their home earn 19 percent 
less than males with a child, 16 percent less than males without a child, and also about 3 
percent less than female officers without children in their home. While I observe both a 
marriage and motherhood effect on police income, parenthood status exerts a stronger 
negative impact than marriage on income for female police officers and motherhood at 
least partially explains the marriage effects. 
I have shown that married female officers or police officers who are mothers are 
paid less than their male counterparts. Ridgeway and Correll (2004) have argued that 
the “fatherhood wage premium” as well as the “motherhood wage penalty” is due to 
institutionalized gender inequalities. Law enforcement is commonly recognized as a 
gendered institution (Acker 1990; Garcia 2003), which possesses a culture of specific 
masculine qualities that places a high value on physical strength (Schulze, 2011). 
Females have difficulties being accepted into this profession and have generally been 
perceived as not strong enough to do police work (Archbold and Schulz 2012). Franklin 
(2007) also points out the gendered nature of the police institution in which female 
police officers are degraded, subordinated, and oppressed by male officers. Females 
who are married and may have more responsibilities for childrearing appear to face 
greater gender disadvantages in income within law enforcement institutions. 
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On the other hand, policing is a highly dangerous job, with the potential for 
violence in the line of duty, physical dangers and risks, and high levels of stress and 
fatigue (Territo and Vetter 1981). The lives of police officers are full of uncertainty as 
police employees are often asked to put their lives on the line. These unique features of 
police work (e.g.: shift changes, dangers and risks, the possibility of being called into 
work at any time of the day or night), present several challenges for females, especially 
females with children (Ellis 2017). The cultural notions concerning motherhood may 
make it harder for females to balance the role of mother and police officer. To display 
the culturally presumed gender roles of being a mother, many female officers may be 
forced (or feel forced) to give up on the chance of promotion (Archbold and Schulz 
2012) or may accept less dangerous and less well-paid positions by choice. Female 
officers have also been found to have a relatively high divorce rate (Ellis 2017), and this 
may be explained by these women being forced to juggle multiple and conflicting social 
roles and identities in navigating their personal and professional lives. We do see from 
the descriptive statistics that females have a much lower rates of marriage and having 
children in the household. Male police officers may not experience the same trade-off 
between high income and high risk of police work and their socially defined role of 
father, as these social roles may be more aligned for these individuals. 
When tracking any changes in the marriage and parenthood income difference 
over time, the results show a stable non-effect of marriage on female police officers’ 
income. However, the predicted marital income difference from 1976 to 2017 among 
males and females reveals that the marriage income premium for male officers remains 
remarkably stable over time, which is contradictory to previous research of the 
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declining marriage premium for men (Cohen 2002). Similarly, the trend of parenthood 
income differences among male police officers also suggests that the large income 
benefit for fatherhood has not changed in the past 41 years. Female officers, on the 
other hand, experience a motherhood penalty that appears to be growing, particularly 
after accounting for union membership. This result is also contradictory to previous 
research on the motherhood penalty in the general labor market, which suggests a stable 
motherhood penalty over time (Avellar and Smock 2003; Misra and Strader 2013). 
It is surprising to see these persistent marriage and motherhood penalties for 
female police officers. In recent decades, one of the most impressive changes in the 
police labor force has been the dramatic movement of females into law enforcement 
employment, where they often share the same responsibilities as their male counterparts 
(Rabe-Hemp, 2009; Schulze, 2011). With the work behavior of women and men 
converging, we might expect that the income for married and childrearing female police 
officers would draw closer to that for married and childrearing males, and the gendered 
marital and parenthood income differences would decline over time. In addition, the 
laws and regulations governing this occupational space should decrease the gender gap 
in pay and reduce the negative effects of marriage and motherhood on income for 
female officers. But my findings contradict this presumption. Indeed, male officers 
enjoy stable income advantages if they are married or fathers, but females continuously 
face a motherhood penalty. Through my analyses, I have shown that this public-sector 
occupation does not prevent this form of gender inequality. 
Regarding the effect of membership in police union on marriage and parenthood 
income penalty, the findings are consistent with previous research that union 
28 
membership exerts a gendered effect on police income, by increasing the earnings for 
both male and female police officers, but also intensifying the gender income gap 
among police (Luo et al. 2018). Police occupation is characterized as high percentage of 
unionized institution. Although males and females both benefit from joining a union, 
disappointingly, it mainly protects the interests of the predominate members of the 
union, in this case males (Schuck 2014). Males, irrespective of their marital and 
parental status, have kept experiencing an increase in income since 1990, whereas 
females’ income is declining during this shortened time-series. Consequently, the 
income differential among police officers differs from that without controlling for 
union. However, further research is needed to explore why union membership exerts 
such a gendered effect on income for male and female police officers. 
 There are several limitations to this study that deserve mention. The primary 
limitation is the inability of this dataset to account for some important measurements 
that affect income. The CPS does not include information about work experience or 
tenure at job. This is a major limitation because both of these factors play an important 
role in shaping income processes within occupations. In particular, without a measure of 
job tenure we cannot unpack whether mothers are underpaid because they take time off 
to have and raise their children or because of structural gender inequality within this 
occupation. Although I control for the linear and curvilinear effects of the age of 
respondents and I expect this measure to account for some of this variation, I cannot 
accurately examine how work experience and tenure may shape these processes with 
these data. While a large-scale labor force dataset allows me to trace some of the 
moments of occupational inequality over time, data that focus specifically on law 
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enforcement and some of the unique features of this work would be better suited to 
uncover some of the more fine-grained differences within this domain. Aligned with 
this concern, these data do not provide detailed information on the specifics of each 
police job. For example, I cannot determine what rank my police officers hold and there 
is no information about the overall size of the police department in which these officers 
are working. This missing information may exert an important impact on police 
officers’ yearly income, further influencing the gendered income disparity within police 
occupation. While I find that there are no meaningful differences between ‘policemen 
and detectives’, and ‘sheriffs and bailiffs’, I am unable to provide a more detailed 
analysis of the different types of police work. 
Finally, by focusing on one occupation I may be muting the actual gender 
difference within the public sector. While focusing on a single occupation helps 
alleviate some concerns, it may introduce others. For example, due to the relatively high 
earnings of police (particular compared to educational peers), individuals may be more 
likely to join in this occupation even if there are moments of gender inequality. Other 
public-sector jobs, such as public school teachers, may experience less gender 
inequality but also certainly experience lower income due to the cultural value place on 
this type of work. By using police as a case study, I acknowledge that my findings, 
while suggestive, may not be completely representative of other public-sector 
occupations. 
 My research advances the understanding of the marriage and parenthood effects 
on income across multiple dimensions. First, in contrast to much of the previous 
research on marriage and parenthood’s effects on income, I focus on occupational 
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gender inequality within a specific public-sector occupation. Previous research has 
largely ignored the public sector, because researchers may have assumed a smaller 
degree of occupational gender inequality based on strict laws and regulations governing 
these occupations. But we see from previous research, both qualitative or quantitative 
studies, that gender inequality does exist in the police occupation. Women in this 
public-sector job also experience a persistent wage penalty. Policy implications can be 
employed to reduce the disadvantages presented to female police officers, such as hiring 
and retaining more women within a law enforcement agency, providing childcare for 
working police men and women, regular gender sensitive training for the human 
resource branches of law enforcement. Second, beyond the overall income effect of 
marriage and parenthood, I explore whether marriage or motherhood plays a stronger 
role in shaping the compensation structure of female police officer. For female police 
officers, having a child has a stronger adverse effect on income compared to marriage, 
and the motherhood effect appears to explain much of the variation in my measures of 
marital status. Finally, with the benefit of a large dataset and long-time series I map out 
how these income differences among males and females have changed over time. To 
my surprise, not only is this public-sector job not protective against these forms of 
occupational gender inequality, but the disadvantages female law enforcement officers 
experience has remained stable or gotten worse overtime. However, more studies and 
fine-grained data are needed to explore whether the mechanisms behind the marriage 
and motherhood income penalties among police are similar or different from the 
common mechanisms used to explain this occupation gender inequality within the 
overall labor market.  
31 
References 
Acker, Joan. 1990. "Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered 
Organizations." Gender & Society 4(2):139-58. 
 
Ahituv, Avner, and Robert I. Lerman. 2007. "How Do Marital Status, Work Effort, and  
Wage Rates Interact?" Demography 44(3):623-47. 
 
Alkadry, Mohamad G., and Leslie E. Tower. 2006. "Unequal Pay: The Role of Gender."  
Public Administration Review 66(6):888-98. 
 
Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina, and Jean Kimmel. 2005. "The Motherhood Wage Gap for  
Women in the United States: The Importance of College and Fertility Delay." Review  
of Economics of the Household 3(1):17-48. 
 
Anderson, Deborah J., Melissa Binder, and Kate Krause. 2003. "The Motherhood Wage  
Penalty Revisited: Experience, Heterogeneity, Work Effort, and Work-Schedule  
Flexibility." Industrial and Labor Relations Review 56(2):273-94. 
 
Antonovics, Kate, and Robert Town. 2004. "Are All the Good Men Married?  
Uncovering the Sources of the Marital Wage Premium." The American Economic  
Review 94(2):317-21. 
 
Archbold, Carol A., and Dorothy Moses Schulz. 2012. "Research on Women in  
Policing: A Look at the Past, Present and Future." Sociology Compass 6(9):694-706. 
 
Ashwin, Sarah, and Olga Isupova. 2014. "“Behind Every Great Man…”: The Male  
Marriage Wage Premium Examined Qualitatively." Journal of Marriage and Family  
76(1):37-55. 
 
Avellar, Sarah, and Pamela J. Smock. 2003. "Has the Price of Motherhood Declined  
over Time? A Cross-Cohort Comparison of the Motherhood Wage Penalty." Journal of  
Marriage and Family 65(3):597-607. 
 
Bartlett, Robin L., and Charles Callahan. 1984. "Wage Determination and Marital  
Status: Another Look." Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society  
23(1):90-6. 
 
Becker, Gary S. 1981. A Treatise on the Family. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University  
Press. 
 
Becker, Gary S. 1985. "Human-Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor."  
Journal of Labor Economics 3(1):S33-S58. 
 
Benard, Stephen, and Shelley J. Correll. 2010. "Normative Discrimination and the  
Motherhood Penalty." Gender & Society 24(5):616-46. 
32 
Bernhardt, Annette, Martina Morris, and Mark S. Handcock. 1995. "Women’s Gains or  
Men’s Losses? A Closer Look at the Shrinking Gender Gap in Earnings." American  
Journal of Sociology 101(2):302-28. 
 
Blau, Francine D., and Lawrence M. Kahn. 2007a. "The Gender Pay Gap: Have Women  
Gone as Far as They Can?" Academy of Management Perspectives 21(1):7-23. 
 
Blau, Francine D., and Lawrence M. Kahn. 2007b. "Changes in the Labor Supply  
Behavior of Married Women: 1980–2000." Journal of Labor Economics 25(3):393-438. 
 
Bonilla, Roberto, and Francis Kiraly. 2013. "Marriage Wage Premium in a Search  
Equilibrium." Labor Economics 24:107-15. 
 
Buchmann, Claudia, and Anne McDaniel. 2016. "Motherhood and the Wages of  
Women in Professional Occupations." RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of  
the Social Sciences 2(4):128-50. 
 
Budig, Michelle, and Paula England. 2001. "The Wage Penalty for Motherhood."  
American Sociological Review 66(2):204-25. 
 
Budig, Michelle, and Melissa Hodges. 2010. "Differences in Disadvantage: Variation in  
the Motherhood Penalty across White Women’s Earnings Distribution." American  
Sociological Review 75(5):705-28. 
 
Burkhauser, Richard V., Shuaizhang Feng, and Stephen P. Jenkins. 2009. "Using the  
P90/P10 Index to Measure U.S. Inequality Trends with Current Population Survey  
Data: A View from Inside the Census Bureau Vaults." Review of Income and Wealth  
55:166-85. 
 
Byker, Tanya. 2016. "The Opt-Out Continuation: Education, Work, and Motherhood  
from 1984 to 2012." RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social  
Sciences 2(4):34-70.  
 
Cheng, Siwei. 2015. "The Accumulation of (Dis)advantage: The Intersection of Gender  
and Race in the Long-Term Wage Effect of Marriage." American Sociological Review  
81(1):29-56. 
 
Chun, Hyunbae, and Injae Lee. 2001. "Why Do Married Men Earn More: Productivity  
or Marriage Selection?" Economic Inquiry 39(2):307-19. 
 
Cohen, Philip N. 2002. "Cohabitation and the Declining Marriage Premium for Men."  
Work and Occupations 29(3):346-63. 
 
Cohen, Philip N., and Matt L. Huffman. 2003a. "Individuals, Jobs, and Labor Markets:  
The Devaluation of Women's Work." American Sociological Review 68(3):443-63. 
 
33 
Cohen, Philip N., and Matt L. Huffman. 2003b. "Occupational Segregation and the  
Devaluation of Women's Work across U.S. Labor Markets." Social Forces 81(3):881- 
908. 
 
Cohen, Yinon, and Yitchak Haberfeld. 1991. "Why Do Married Men Earn More Than  
Unmarried Men?" Social Science Research 20(1):29-44. 
 
Correll, Shelley J., Stephen Benard, and In Paik. 2007. "Getting a Job: Is There a  
Motherhood Penalty?" American Journal of Sociology 112(5):1297-338. 
 
Davies-Netzley, Sally Ann. 1998. "Women above the Glass Ceiling: Perceptions on  
Corporate Mobility and Strategies for Success." Gender & Society 12(3):339-55. 
 
de Linde Leonard, Megan, and T. D. Stanley. 2015. "Married with Children: What  
Remains When Observable Biases Are Removed from the Reported Male Marriage  
Wage Premium." Labor Economics 33:72-80. 
 
Dougherty, Christopher. 2006. "The Marriage Earnings Premium as a Distributed Fixed  
Effect." The Journal of Human Resources 41(2):433-43. 
 
Ellis, Lacy. 2017. "Policemoms: Perceived Challenges Impacting Gender Equity in  
Policing?" Journal of Ethical and Legal Issues 11:1-36. 
 
England, Paula, Paul Allison, and Yuxiao Wu. 2007. "Does Bad Pay Cause Occupations  
to Feminize, Does Feminization Reduce Pay, and How Can We Tell with Longitudinal  
Data?" Social Science Research 36(3):1237-56. 
 
England, Paula, Melissa S. Herbert, Barbara Stanek Kilbourne, Lori L. Reid, and Lori  
McCreary Megdal. 1994. "The Gendered Valuation of Occupations and Skills: Earnings  
in 1980 Census Occupations." Social Forces 73(1):65-100. 
 
England, Paula, Jonathan Bearak, Michelle J. Budig and Melissa J. Hodges. 2016. "Do  
Highly Paid, Highly Skilled Women Experience the Largest Motherhood Penalty?"  
American Sociological Review 81(6):1161-89. 
 
Felfe, Christina. 2012. "The Motherhood Wage Gap: What about Job Amenities?"  
Labor Economics 19(1):59-67. 
 
Ffrench, Margot and Linda Waugh. 1998. "The Weaker Sex? Women and Police  
Work." International Journal of Police Science & Management 1(3):260-75. 
 
Flood, Sarah, Miriam King, Steven Ruggles, and J. Robert Warren. 2017. Integrated  
Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version 5.0. [Dataset].  
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. https://doi.org/10.18128/D030.V5.0. 
 
Franklin, Cortney A. 2007. "Male Peer Support and the Police Culture: Understanding 
34 
the Resistance and Opposition of Women in Policing." Women & Criminal Justice 
16(3):1-25. 
 
Gangl, Markus, and Andrea Ziefle. 2009. "Motherhood, Labor Force Behavior, and  
Women’s Careers: An Empirical Assessment of the Wage Penalty for Motherhood in  
Britain, Germany, and the United States." Demography 46(2):341-69. 
 
Garcia, Venessa. 2003. "“Difference” in the Police Department: Women, Policing, and  
“Doing Gender”." Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 19(3):330-44. 
 
Ginther, Donna K., & Madeline Zavodny. 2001. "Is the Male Marriage Premium Due to  
Selection? The Effect of Shotgun Weddings on the Return to Marriage." Journal of  
Population Economics 14(2):313-28.  
 
Glauber, Rebecca. 2007. "Marriage and the Motherhood Wage Penalty among African  
Americans, Hispanics, and Whites." Journal of Marriage and Family 69(4):951-61. 
 
Glauber, Rebecca. 2008. "Race and Gender in Families and at Work: The Fatherhood  
Wage Premium." Gender & Society 22(1):8-30. 
 
Glauber, Rebecca. 2012. "Women’s Work and Working Conditions: Are Mothers  
Compensated for Lost Wages?" Work and Occupations 39(2):115-38. 
 
Goldin, Claudia. 2006. "The Quiet Revolution That Transformed Women's  
Employment, Education, and Family." American Economic Review 96(2):1-21. 
 
Gough, Margaret, and Mary Noonan. 2013. "A Review of the Motherhood Wage  
Penalty in the United States." Sociology Compass 7(4):328-42. 
 
Gupta, Sanjiv. 1999. "The Effects of Transitions in Marital Status on Men’s  
Performance of Housework." Journal of Marriage and Family 61(3):700-11. 
 
Hersch, Joni, and Leslie S. Stratton. 2000. "Household Specialization and the Male  
Marriage Wage Premium." Industrial and Labor Relations Review 54(1):78-94. 
 
Hodges, Melissa J., and Michelle J. Budig. 2010. "Who Gets the Daddy Bonus?:  
Organizational Hegemonic Masculinity and the Impact of Fatherhood on Earnings."  
Gender & Society 24(6):717-45. 
 
Ipshita, Pal, and Jane Waldfogel. 2016. "The Family Gap in Pay: New Evidence for  
1967 to 2013." RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences  
2(4):104-27. 
 
Ireland, Connie, and Bruce Berg. 2007. "Women in Parole: Respect and Rapport."  
International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 52(4):474-91. 
 
35 
Jarrell, Stephen B., and T. D. Stanley. 2004. "Declining Bias and Gender Wage  
Discrimination? A Meta-Regression Analysis." The Journal of Human Resources  
39(3):828-38. 
 
Kahn, Joan R., Javier García-Manglano, and Suzanne M. Bianchi. 2014. "The  
Motherhood Penalty at Midlife: Long-Term Effects of Children on Women's Careers."  
Journal of Marriage and Family 76(1):56-72. 
 
Katrin, Auspurg, Hinz Thomas, and Sauer Carsten. 2017. "Why Should Women Get  
Less? Evidence on the Gender Pay Gap from Multifactorial Survey Experiments."  
American Sociological Review 82(1):179-210. 
 
Kelly, Kimberly, and Linda Grant. 2012. "Penalties and Premiums: The Impact of  
Gender, Marriage, and Parenthood on Faculty Salaries in Science, Engineering and  
Mathematics (SEM) and Non-SEM Fields." Social Studies of Science 42(6):869-96. 
 
Killewald, Alexandra. 2013. "A Reconsideration of the Fatherhood Premium: Marriage,  
Coresidence, Biology, and Fathers’ Wages." American Sociological Review 78(1):96- 
116. 
 
Killewald, Alexandra, and Margaret Gough. 2013. "Does Specialization Explain 
 Marriage Penalties and Premiums?" American Sociological Review 78(3):477-502. 
 
Korenman, Sanders, and David Neumark. 1991. "Does Marriage Really Make Men  
More Productive?" The Journal of Human Resources 26(2):282-307. 
 
Korenman, Sanders, and David Neumark. 1992. "Marriage, Motherhood and Wages."  
The Journal of Human Resources 27(2):233-55. 
 
Larrimore, Jeff, Richard Burkhauser, Shuaizhang Feng, and Laura Zayatz. 2008.  
"Consistent Cell Means for Topcoded Incomes in the Public Use March CPS (1976- 
2007)." Journal of Economic and Social Measurement 33(2/3):89-128. 
 
Leger, Kristen. 1997. "Public Perceptions of Female Police Officers on Patrol." 
American Journal of Criminal Justice 21(2):231-49. 
 
Levanon, Asaf, Paula England, and Paul Allison. 2009. "Occupational Feminization and 
 Pay: Assessing Causal Dynamics Using 1950-2000 U.S. Census Data." Social Forces  
88(2):865-91. 
 
Lincoln, Anne E. 2008. "Gender, Productivity, and the Marital Wage Premium."  
Journal of Marriage and Family 70(3):806-14. 
 
Loughran, David S., and Julie M. Zissimopoulos. 2009. "Why Wait? The Effect of  
Marriage and Childbearing on the Wages of Men and Women." The Journal of Human  
Resources 44(2):326-49. 
36 
Lundberg, Shelly, and Elaina Rose. 2000. "Parenthood and the Earnings of Married  
Men and Women." Labour Economics 7(6):689-710. 
 
Luo, Xiaoshuang, Cyrus Schleifer, and Christopher Hill. 2018. "Unions and Gender  
Inequality in Police Income." Working Paper. 
 
Mandel, Hadas, and Moshe Semyonov. 2014. "Gender Pay Gap and Employment  
Sector: Sources of Earnings Disparities in the United States, 1970-2010." Demography  
51(5):1597-618. 
 
Meyer, Peter B., and Anastasiya M. Osborne. 2005. "Proposed Category System for  
1960-2000 Census Occupations." Office of Productivity and Technology, U.S. Bureau  
of Labor Statistics. 
 
Misra, Joya, and Eiko Strader. 2013. "Gender Pay Equity in Advanced Countries: The  
Role of Parenthood and Policies." Journal of International Affairs 67(1):27-XIX. 
 
Moore, Thomas S. 2017. "Occupational Career Change and Gender Wage Inequality."  
Work and Occupations 45(1):82-121. 
 
Mouw, Ted, and Arne L. Kalleberg. 2010. "Occupations and the Structure of Wage  
Inequality in the United States, 1980s to 2000s." American Sociological Review  
75(3):402-31. 
 
Pollmann-Schult, Matthias. 2011. "Marriage and Earnings: Why Do Married Men Earn  
more than Single Men?" European Sociological Review 27(2):147-63. 
 
Rabe-Hemp, Cara E. 2009. "POLICEwomen or PoliceWOMEN?: Doing Gender and  
Police Work." Feminist Criminology 4(2):114-29. 
 
Reed, Robert W., and Kathleen Harford. 1989. "The Marriage Premium and  
Compensating Wage Differentials." Journal of Population Economics 2(4):237-65. 
 
Reese, Catherine, C. and Barbara Warner. 2011. "Pay Equity in the States: An Analysis  
of the Gender-Pay Gap in the Public Sector." Review of Public Personnel 
Administration 32(4):312-31. 
 
Reynolds, Jeremy, and Jeffrey B. Wenger. 2012. "He Said, She Said: The Gender Wage  
Gap According to Self and Proxy Reports in the Current Population Survey." Social  
Science Research 41(2):392-411. 
 
Ridgeway, Cecilia L., and Shelly J. Correll. 2004. "Motherhood as a Status  
Characteristic." Journal of Social Issues 60(45):683-700. 
 
Rodgers, William M., and Leslie S. Stratton. 2010. "Male Marital Wage Differentials:  
Training, Personal Characteristics, and Fixed Effects." Economic Inquiry 48(3):722-42. 
37 
Schleifer, Cyrus, and Amy Miller. 2017. "Occupational Gender Inequality among  
American Clergy, 1976-2015: Revisiting the Stained-Glass Ceiling." Sociology of  
Religion: A Quarterly Review 00:01-24. 
 
Schuck, Amie M. 2014. "Female Representation in Law Enforcement: The Influence of  
Screening, Unions, Incentives, Community Policing, CALEA, and Size." Police  
Quarterly 17(1):54-78. 
 
Schulz, Dorothy Moses. 1993. "From Policewoman to Police Officer: An Unfinished  
Revolution." Police Studies: The International Review of Police Development 16:90-8. 
 
Schulz, Moses Dorothy. 1995. From Social Worker to Crimefighter: Women in United  
States Municipal Policing. Westport, CT: Praeger. 
 
Schulze, Corina. 2011. "Family Leave and Law Enforcement: A Survey of Parents in  
U.S. Police Departments." Critical Criminology 19(2):137-53. 
 
Schwartz, Christine. 2010. "Earnings Inequality and the Changing Association between 
Spouses’ Earnings." American Journal of Sociology 115(5):1524-57. 
 
Seklecki, Richard, and Rebecca Paynich. 2007. "A National Survey of Female Police  
Officers: An Overview of Findings." Police Practice and Research 8(1):17-30. 
 
Shelley, Tara O’Connor, Melissa Schaefer Morabito, and Jennifer Tobin-Gurley. 2011.  
"Gendered Institutions and Gender Roles: Understanding the Experiences of Women in  
Policing." Criminal Justice Studies 24(4):351-67. 
 
Territo, Leonard, and Harold J. Vetter. 1981. "Stress and Police Personnel." Journal of  
Police Science and Administration 9(2):195-208. 
 
Yu, Wei-hsin, and Janet Chen-Lan Kuo. 2017. "The Motherhood Wage Penalty by  
Work Conditions: How Do Occupational Characteristics Hinder or Empower Mothers?"  
American Sociological Review 82(4):744-69. 
 
Waite, Linda J. 1995. "Does Marriage Matter?" Demography 32(4):483-507. 
 
Weeden, Kim A., Youngjoo Cha, and Mauricio Bucca. 2016. "Long Work Hours, Part- 
Time Work, and Trends in the Gender Gap in Pay, the Motherhood Wage Penalty, and  
the Fatherhood Wage Premium." RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the  
Social Sciences 2(4):71-102. 
38 
Appendix A: Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Male Police Female Police 
Income (2017$)   
   Mean    $67,000     $55,767 
   Median    $61,932     $50,350 
Police officer1   
   Marshals and constables 89.0% 11.0% 
   Policemen and detectives 86.8% 13.2% 
   Sheriffs and bailiffs 75.8% 24.2% 
Married 78.2% 47.5% 
Child in home 64.9% 53.7% 
Age (year) 39 39 
Race 
     White 85.6% 68.2% 
   Black 10.3% 25.9% 
   Other race 4.1% 5.9% 
Education 
     Less than high school 1.3% 0.7% 
   High school 69.9% 65.5% 
   Bachelor's degree 23.5% 26.8% 
   Advanced degree 5.4% 7.0% 
Hours worked per week   
   Part time (< 35 hr/week) 0.9% 2.2% 
   Full time (35-55 hr/week) 92.0% 94.6% 
   Over time (55+ hr/week) 7.1% 3.3% 
City 72.3% 73.9% 
Region 
     Northeast 23.0% 17.1% 
   Midwest 20.8% 17.8% 
   South 32.2% 40.6% 
   West 24.0% 24.5% 
N 16,935 
1 These proportion represent the percentage of male and female police officers  
within each category and therefore the row percentage for each type of police  
officer sum to 1. For the other variables in this table, the percentage is captured  




Table 2. Linear Regression on the Natural Log of Income among Police Officers, 
CPS 1976-2017 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Female  -0.180*** -0.152*** -0.147*** -0.135*** 
 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Married 0.040*** 0.053*** 0.039*** 0.047*** 
 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Child in home 0.020* 0.017* 0.030*** 0.027** 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Interactions     
Female*Married  -0.050**  -0.034 
  (.02)  (.02) 
Female*Child   -0.060*** -0.049** 
   (.02) (.02) 
Controls 
    Year 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) 
Age 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 
 
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) 
Age2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) 
Race     
Black  -0.062*** -0.063*** -0.061*** -0.062*** 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Other race -0.064*** -0.063*** -0.064*** -0.064*** 
 (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Education     
High school 0.180*** 0.180*** 0.178*** 0.178*** 
 
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Bachelor’s degree 0.345*** 0.344*** 0.342*** 0.342*** 
 
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Advanced degree 0.452*** 0.452*** 0.449*** 0.450*** 
 
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Working hours     
Full-time work 0.985*** 0.981*** 0.980*** 0.978*** 
 
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Overtime work 1.116*** 1.111*** 1.110*** 1.108*** 
 
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
City 0.273*** 0.274*** 0.274*** 0.274*** 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
     
40 
Table 2. continued 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Controls (cont.)     
Region     
Midwest -0.123*** -0.123*** -0.123*** -0.122*** 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
South -0.196*** -0.195*** -0.195*** -0.195*** 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
West 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.007 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
N 16,935 
R2   0.323  0.323  0.323  0.323 
adj. R2 0.322    0.322    0.323 0.323 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
1For race, white is the comparison group. Less than high school is the reference category for 
education. Part-time work is the comparison group for working hours. Northeast is treated as 
















Table 3. Linear Regression on the Natural Log of Income among Different Police 
Officers, CPS 1976-2017 
    Police and Detectives     Sheriffs and Bailiffs 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Female  -0.136*** -0.134*** -0.119*** -0.123*** 
 
(.02) (.02) (.03) (.03) 
Married 0.051*** 0.036*** 0.037 0.029 
 
(.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) 
Child in home 0.017* 0.030*** 0.017 0.023 
 (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) 
Interactions     
Female*Married -0.062**  -0.024  
 (.02)  (.04)  
Female*Child  -0.068***  -0.016 
  (.02)  (.03) 
Controls 
    Year 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.000 -0.000 
 
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) 
Age 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 
 
(.00) (.00) (.01) (.01) 
Age2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) 
Race     
Black  -0.043*** -0.040*** -0.031 -0.030 
 (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) 
Other race -0.069*** -0.070*** -0.053 -0.053 
 (.02) (.02) (.04) (.04) 
Education     
High school 0.177*** 0.175*** 0.166** 0.166** 
 
(.03) (.03) (.06) (.06) 
Bachelor’s degree 0.323*** 0.321*** 0.258*** 0.257*** 
 
(.03) (.03) (.06) (.06) 
Advanced degree 0.431*** 0.429*** 0.265*** 0.265*** 
 
(.04) (.04) (.08) (.08) 
Working hours     
Full-time work 1.041*** 1.040*** 0.816*** 0.817*** 
 
(.03) (.03) (.06) (.06) 
Overtime work 1.155*** 1.153*** 0.993*** 0.995*** 
 
(.04) (.04) (.07) (.07) 
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Table 3. continued 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Controls (cont.)     
City 0.255*** 0.255*** 0.229*** 0.229*** 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Region     
Midwest -0.133*** -0.133*** -0.087*** -0.087*** 
 (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) 
South -0.192*** -0.191*** -0.207*** -0.207*** 
 (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) 
West 0.004 0.004 0.040 0.039 
 (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) 
 N  13,390  13,390  3,527    3,527 
R2   0.315   0.315  0.263   0.263 
adj. R2   0.314   0.314 0.259    0.259 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
1For race, white is the comparison group. Less than high school is the reference category for 
education. Part-time work is the comparison group for working hours. Northeast is treated as 















Table 4. Marriage and Child Time Interactions, CPS 1976-2017 
 Male Police Female Police 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Married 0.040* 0.043*** 0.045 0.023 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) 
Child in home 0.028** 0.025 -0.024 -0.002 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) 
Year 0.001 0.001 0.003** 0.003* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Interactions     
   Married*Year 0.000  -0.001  
 (0.00)  (0.00)  
     
   Child*Year  0.000  -0.001 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Controls     
   Age 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
   Age2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
   Race     
     Black -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.052* -0.053* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
     Other race -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.041 -0.042 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
   Education     
     High school 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.334** 0.332** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.11) (0.11) 
     Bachelor's 
degree 0.321
*** 0.321*** 0.550*** 0.548*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.11) (0.11) 
     Advanced 
degree 0.433
*** 0.433*** 0.633*** 0.630*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.11) (0.11) 
   Working hours     
     Full-time work 0.956*** 0.956*** 1.020*** 1.020*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
     Overtime work 1.083*** 1.082*** 1.191*** 1.192*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) 
   City 0.275*** 0.275*** 0.263*** 0.263*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
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Table 4. continued    
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Controls (cont.)     
   Region     
     Midwest -0.125*** -0.125*** -0.097** -0.097** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
     South -0.208*** -0.208*** -0.125*** -0.125*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
     West 0.002 0.002 0.050 0.050 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
N 14,307 14,307         2,628         2,628 
R2 0.315 0.315 0.280 0.280 
adj. R2 0.314 0.314 0.275 0.275 

















Table 5. Linear Regression on the Natural Log of Income by Marriage and Child 
Controlling for Union, CPS 1990-2017 
 Male Police Female Police 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Married 0.060 0.058* 0.131 0.043 
 
(0.05) (0.03) (0.11) (0.05) 
Child in home 0.013 -0.017 0.048 0.099 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.11) 
Union 0.098*** 0.099*** 0.293*** 0.292*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) 
Year 0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Interactions     
Married*Year -0.000  -0.005  
 (0.00)  (0.01)  
Child*Year  0.002  -0.003 
  (0.00)  (0.01) 
Controls     Age 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.046* 0.046* 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Age2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000* -0.000* 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Race     
Black  -0.109*** -0.108*** -0.093 -0.092 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
Other race -0.084 -0.083 0.212 0.212 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (0.11) 
Education     
High school 0.099 0.100 0.034 0.027 
 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.33) (0.33) 
Bachelor’s 
degree 0.284
* 0.285* 0.227 0.219 
 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.33) (0.33) 
Advanced 
degree 0.382
** 0.383** 0.381 0.374 
 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.34) (0.34) 
Working hours     
Full-time work 1.042*** 1.041*** 0.756*** 0.760*** 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.14) 
Overtime work 1.184*** 1.184*** 0.758*** 0.766*** 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.19) (0.19) 
46 
Table 5. continued 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Controls (cont.)     
City 0.261*** 0.262*** 0.283*** 0.284*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) 
Region     
Midwest -0.144*** -0.145*** -0.117 -0.114 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) 
South -0.180*** -0.180*** 0.016 0.016 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) 
West 0.002 0.002 -0.076 -0.076 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) 
N 2,041 2,041          472          472 
R2 0.331 0.331 0.309    0.308 
adj. R2 0.325 0.325 0.282 0.281 

















Appendix B: Figures 
 
 



























































Figure 6. Trend of Income Differences by Parenthood and Gender Controlling for 
Union Membership 
 
 
 
